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COMMENTS

POW COLLABORATION-104 OR TREASON

The prisoner of war situation in the Korean War has been the source of
many problems which are of grave concern to the whole nation.' Probably the
greatest problem from the standpoint of persons involved has been that of collaboration or misconduct while in an enemy prison. Of the 4,428 American fighting men returned from enemy prison camps, all of whom were screened, the
conduct of 565 was questioned. Three hundred seventy-three cases were cleared
or dropped.2 The services proceeded cautiously with the remaining 192 cases,
and sifted those to be brought to trial.' Since the end of the Korean War, twelve
men have been court-martialed on collaboration charges. Two officers and one
enlisted man have been acquitted. Six enlisted men have been convicted and
sentenced to terms ranging from two years to life imprisonment. Two Lieutenant
Colonels and a Major have been convicted: one was dismissed from the Army;
one was suspended from rank for two years; and another was sentenced to ten
4
years.
The specific section of the Uniform Code of Military Justice5 dealing with
collaboration is Article 104:6
Aiding the enemy.

Any person who-(1) aids, or attempts to aid, the

enemy with arms, ammunition, supplies, money, or other thing; or (2)
without proper authority, knowingly harbors or protects or gives intelligence
to, or communicates or corresponds with or holds any intercourse with the
enemy, either directly or indirectly; shall suffer death or such other punishment as a court-martial or military commission may direct.

Article III, Section 3, of the United States Constitution seemingly defines the
same crime:
Treason against the United States, shall consist only . . . in adhering to
'See SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ADvISORY COMMITTEE, REPORT ON PRISONERS OF
WAR, POW, THE FIGHT CONTINUES AFTER THE BATTLE (1955)
(hereinafter cited
as POW REPORT).
2 POW REPORT 25.

8 112 cases were still pending as of July, 1955, and it was felt to be fairly certain
that substantially less than half of those would be brought to trial. Ibid. See also 1954
ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 123.

4 New York Times, Dec. 22, 1955, p. 11, col. 1.
664 STAT. 108 (1950), 50 U.S.C. §§ 551-736 (1952).
6 Article 104 is former Article of War 81 and first appeared in American military
law, in substantially the same form, as Articles of War 27 and 28 of 1775. Article 104
can also be traced to Article 8 of the Code of James II, and to Articles 67, 71, 76, and 77
of Gustavus Adolphus. See WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 629 (2d ed.
Reprint 1920) (hereinafter cited as WINTHROP).

There have also been convictions for collaboration under Article 134, U.C.M.J., the
See United States v. Fleming, CM 377486 (1954).

catch-all article.

their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort. No.Person shall be convicted
of Treason unless on the Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act,
or on Confession in open Court. 7
Does the conduct prohibited by Article 104 constitute treason? This question
was recently before a federal district court in the case of Major Ronald E. Alley,8
one of the men convicted of collaborationY
Alley had been a prisoner of war in Korea for about thirty-three months.
After his return to this country he was charged inter alia with a violation of
Article 104. Before trial, but after the court-martial had convened, he brought
suit in the federal district court for the District of Columbia against the Secretary
of Defense to enjoin the court-martial on the ground that the acts with which
the Army charged him amounted to treason, and that treason was triable only in
the civil courts. The court sustained the Government's motion to dismiss on
the ground that the acts charged did not constitute treason. There was therefore
no reason to decide whether treason was triable only in the civil courts.
The question was thus resolved by the court's holding that conduct charged
as violative of Article 104 is not treason. This disposition of the case seems unsatisfactory in light of the restrictive policy of the treason clause.10
The Substantive Scope of Treason
Historically treason is a generic term for subversive activities against the
Government, but its long coexistence with other crimes of a subversive nature
casts doubt on whether the crime of treason embodies the generic term."
It is clear that if the Government wants to prosecute for treason it must
charge the accused with conduct that constitutes adhering to the enemy, giving
them aid and comfort. The converse is not so clear: when the Government charges
one with conduct that constitutes adhering to the enemy, giving them aid and
comfort, must it prosecute for treason? The latter is the basic problem of the
Alley case.
It has been stated by at least one writer, 12 and argued by the Government in
the Alley case, that since treason is a crime of specific intent, i.e., there must
be an intent to betray, Article 104 defines a different crime because no intent to
betray need be alleged. However valid that analysis may be in cases involving
an indifferent overt act, where no treasonable intent can be drawn from the
7 The omitted part reads "in levying war against them, or." Treason in this article
is limited to "adhering to the enemy, giving them aid and comfort."
8 Alley v. Wilson, et al., CA 3647, D.D.C., Aug. 31, 1955; appeal docketed, No. 12949,
D.C. Cir. Oct. 24, 1955. See also United States v. Dickenson, 6 U.S.C.M.A. 438 (1955).
0 Alley was found guilty by a general court-martial. CM 387487 (1955).
10 See Hurst, Treason in the United States, 58 Harv. L. Rev. 395 (1944-45).
(This article is in three parts beginning at 226, 395, 806.)
11See Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 45 n.53 (1945); Frohwerk v. United
States, 249 U.S. 204, 210 (1919); Wimmer v. United States, 264 F. 11 (C.C.A. 6th,
1920), cert. denied, 253 U.S. 494 (1920). But see Minturn, J., dissenting in Colgan v.
Sullivan, 94 N.J.L. 201, 206, 109 A. 568, 570 (1920); Anderson, J., dissenting in Taylor
v. State, 194 Miss. 1, 54-57, 11 So.2d 663, 681-82 (1943).
12 WINTHROP 630.

act itself, it would not seem applicable to Article 104 violations because the acts
prohibited are clear acts of aid and comfort from which the intent to betray can
be inferred.' Since violations of Article 104 must be committed intentionally, 4
the proof of the intent to do the act is proof of the intent to betray. Thus the
specific intent required for a treason conviction is present where there is a specific
intent to effect the prohibited result, i.e., aiding the enemy. Any defense of no
specific intent (intent to betray) in this type case merely raises the irrelevant
question of motive.'3
Martin v. Young " dealt with this problem. A discharged serviceman was

being held for a violation of Article 104 under Article 3 (a), 17 which gave the
military jurisdiction to try persons for offenses which they had committeed while
in the service, and for which they could not be tried in the civil courts. The court
held that the conduct charged as violative of Article 104 could be tried in the
civil courts as a violation of the statutes codifying the constitutional definition
of treason. 8 The Government argued that the criminal intent needed for a
treason conviction is not necessary for an Article 104 conviction. The court,
without deciding whether the intent needed for treason and Article 104 were
the same, rejected this contention on the ground that the specification charged
that the petitioner acted wrongfully, unlawfully, and knowingly; and that this
was tantamount to the intent needed for a treason allegation. In United States
v. Batchelor,' another Article 104 case, the board of review referred to the
discussion in United States v. Chandler20 about the intent necessary for treason,
and approved the law officer's instructions regarding criminality and intent. In
the Chandler case the court approved a charge to the jury wherein the court
1" "Proof that a citizen did give aid and comfort to an enemy may well be in the
circumstances sufficient evidence that he adhered to that enemy and intended and purposed
to strike at his own country." Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 31 (1945). "When
the act itself amounts to treason it involves the intention, and such was the character of
this act." (The act was delivery of certain prisoners to the enemy). United States v.
Hodges, 26 Fed. Cas. No. 15,374, at 334 (C.C.D. Md. 1815). See also Warren, Aid
and Comfort to the Enemy, 27 Yale L.J. 331, 343 (1918); Hurst supra note 10,
at 816-17.
1In
general the same intent is required in the military courts as is required in the

civil courts in regard to crimes punishable by the punitive articles of the U.C.M.J. In the
MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, 1 183 (1951), it is stated that acts violating Article
104 must be performed knowingly. Every case found has used some variation of the words

knowingly, wrongfully and unlawfully in the charge. These are generally taken to mean
criminal intent. See Martin v. Young, 134 F. Supp. 204, 208 (N.D. Cal. 1955); MANUAL
FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, 1 28 (1951).
1 The profit motive or desire to accommodate a friend does not negate a criminal
intent.

See Douglas, J., dissenting in Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 55 (1945).

For a collection of cases affirming this point see HURST supra note 10, at 817 n.231. Of
course duress, coercion, or brainwashing constitute a good defense if one of these were
to negate the intent.
'( 134 F. Supp. 204 (N.D. Cal. 1955).
17 Article 3(a) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice was subsequently held unconstitutional in United States ex rel. Toth. v. Quarles, 76 Sup. Ct. 1 (1955).
18 18 U.S.C. § 2381 (1952).
19CM 377832 (1954).
20 171 F.2d 921, 942 (1st Cir. 1948).

stated, "in the law of treason, like the law of lesser crimes, every person is
assumed to intend the natural consequences that he himself knows will result
from his act," and "aperson cannot do an act which he knows will aid the enemy
and then attempt to disclaim criminal intent and knowledge by saying that one's
motive was not to aid the enemy."21
It seems clear from these cases that the intent involved in both Article 104
violations and in treason is one and the same, unless one chooses to engage in
logomachy. To allow the Government to prove the act and the intent, as is
required by Article 104, but to disclaim a treason prosecution, seems contrary
to the restrictive policy of the treason clause. If the two elements of the crime are
present, treason has been committed. Treason, the betrayal of one's allegiance,
is not a fact to be proved but a legal conclusion, a name for certain types of
conduct.
The reasoning in Ex parte Qui'in2 2 may be thought to justify convictions
under Article 104. Eight German saboteurs who landed in this country during
World War II were being tried under the laws of war and the Articles of War
by a military commission. On its own motion the Court considered and rejected
the argument that one of the saboteurs, who was a United States citizen, had to
be tried for treason. Speaking for a unanimous Court, Chief Justice Stone said:
The argument leaves out of account the nature of the offense which the
Government charges and which the Act of Congress, by incorporating the
law of war, punishes. It is that each petitioner, in circumstances which gave
him the status of an enemy belligerent, passed our military and naval lines
and defenses or went behind those lines, in civilian dress and with a hostile
purpose. The offense was complete when with that purpose they enteredor, having so entered, they remained upon--our territory in time of war
without uniform or other appropriate means of identification.
For that
reason, even when committed by a citizen, the offense is distinct from the
crime of treason defined in Article III, § 3 of the Constitution, since the
absence of uniform essential to one is irrelevant to the other. Cf. Morgan
v. Devine, 237 U.S. 632; Albrecht v. United28States, 273 U.S. 1, 11-12.

This reasoning has been criticized by Hurst:

The decisions cited as analogies by the Court are now standard authorities
holding that the double jeopardy clause of the Constitution is not violated by
conviction for two or more offenses which are in substance part of the same
criminal transaction, but which involve different elements of the allegation.
It is not a convincing technique of interpretation to apply to a constitutional
guaranty having in its own history of policy a formal test developed under a
different clause of the Constitution, with no demonstration that the policies
behind the respective clauses are so similar as to be fulfilled by the same
criterion. The double jeopardy clause is historically a guaranty against the
abuse of law enforcement machinery as such, without reference to abuses
peculiar to any one of the major types of crime. When the Constitution
singles out the offense of treason as subject to special abuse, citation of a
highly technical rule developed by a judicial construction out of the general
guaranty is in itself little evidence that the peculiar dangers against which the
special guaranty was erected have been avoided.
21 In Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 31-32 (1945),
intent involved in treason in similar words.
22317 U.S. 1, 38 (1942).
28 Hurst supra note 10, at 395.

the Court spoke of the

The reasoning in Ex parte Quirin has been followed in United States v.
Rosenberg,24 where the defendants were convicted of violating the Espionage
Act of 1917. This Act prohibited the communication of certain information to
a foreign government, regardless of injury to this country and regardless of
whether the foreign country was an enemy. The court said that giving this intelligence to the enemy is irrelevant to the espionage offense, but necessary to treason;
it thus found the element "essential to one" but "irrelevant to the other."
But the Quirin reasoning does not support the holding in the Alley case.
The evidence needed to convict for a violation of Article 104 is the same as is
needed to convict for treason. There are no different elements involved, and it
would appear to be a clear case of double jeopardy if the Government attempted
to prosecute for both offenses on the basis of the same conduct. 25 This case seems
26
to be the one that Justice Jackson was referring to in Cramer v. United States,
when speaking of the power of Congress to enact prohibitions of specified acts

thought detrimental to the national safety: "Of course we do not intimate that
Congress could dispense with the two-witness rule merely by giving the same
offense a different name."
Some have urged that, although conduct violative of Article 104 does constitute treason, it is permissible to try offenders under the Articles of War and the
law of war.
(0) ne who aids the enemy in time of war . . . has thereby brought himself
within the class of persons who are in fact participants in the war; who,
although not in uniform and not a part of the enemy's forces in a purely
military sense, are nevertheless a part of the very effective and direct opposition
to our army and navy. By so making themselves an integral part of the
enemy's strength being used against us, they placed themselves squarely
among those who, whether they are criminals in the ordinary and moral
sense or not are certainly war criminals within the
meaning of interna27
tional law as expressed in the laws and usages of war.

Such reasoning merely begs the question because treason can only be committed
during precisely the same time that the offense against the law of war can be
committed. One cannot aid the enemy when there is no enemy to aid. To allow

Congress to supersede the treason clause during time of war would be to render
the treason clause wholly nugatory.

24 195 F.2d 583, 610-11 (2d Cir. 1952).
25 Double jeopardy as prohibited by the fifth amendment is present when there are
two prosecutions for the same offense, Burton v. United States, 202 U.S. 344, 380 (1906),
and the test of identical offenses is the identity of evidence needed to convict. Morgan v.
Devine, 237 U.S. 632 (1915).
Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684 (1949), impliedly
accepted the proposition that the double jeopardy clause applies to the military. See also
Article 44, U.C.M.J.
26325 U.S. 1, 45 (1945).
27McKinney, Spies and Traitors, 12 Ill. L. Rev. 591, 623-24 (1918). The
writer was referring to civilians, assuming that no problem existed in regard to military
jurisdiction over the military; but the reasoning is still pertinent here.

The ProceduralAspects of Treason
Assuming that conduct violative of Article 104 does constitute treason and
must be tried as such, the further problem of the court wherein it shall be
tried remains.
It is interesting to note that Article 104 expressly applies to all persons, not
solely to those in the military establishment. Commentators 28 have maintained
that Article 104 means what it says; but it is almost impossible to give the words
"Any person who--" a literal interpretation in light of Ex parte Milligan,
Ex parte Quirin,0 and the recent case of United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles.",
However, for our purposes we will concern ourselves with jurisdiction of the
crime of treason since the determination of that matter will render many of the
questions of jurisdiction over the person irrelevant.
The reasoning in Ex parte Quirin 2 sheds some light on the question of which
court has jurisdiction over treason. In determining whether the saboteur, who
was a citizen, had to be tried for treason, the Court first satisfied itself that Ex
parte Milligan did not bar military jurisdiction. It would seem that that would
answer any question raised by the guaranties of the treason clause. However,
the Court deemed it necessary to show that treason was not the gravamen of the
charge. 3 The implication to be drawn is that if treason were the crime charged,
it would be cognizable only in the civil courts, where all of the procedural
safeguards could be afforded the accused.
In the famous trial of Brigadier General William Hull,3 4 the Army charged
him with treason and with cowardice for needlessly surrendering Fort Detroit to
the British in 1813. A distinguished military court, with whom Martin Van
Buren, then a civilian lawyer and later President of the United States, was associated as "special judge advocate," tried the general. The court held that it had
no jurisdiction to try the general for treason and that the accused could not
waive or consent to the jurisdiction over the offense by the military. However,
28See WINTHROP 102-04; AYCOCK AND WURFEL, MILITARY LAW UNDER THE
UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE 65-66 (1955); Hearings before Subcommittee of
the Senate Committee on Armed Services on S. 857 and H.R. 4080, 81st Cong., 1st
Sess. 121, 127 (1949).
But see ROBINSON, JUSTICE IN GREY 380-81 (1941).
294 Wall. 2 (U.S.
1866) (military jurisdiction over civilians not connected with
military precluded where civil courts are open). But see United States v. McDonald, 265 F.
754 (E.D.N.Y. 1920).
30317 U.S. 1 (1942)
(military jurisdiction over enemy belligerents for offenses
against law of war not precluded even though'civil courts are open).
a176 Sup. Ct. 1 (1955) (military jurisdiction over discharged serviceman for offense
committed while in the service precluded despite act of Congress to the contrary). See note
17 supra.
The holding in the Toth case has been extended to deprive the military of jurisdiction
over "camp followers." See Covert v. Reid, 24 U.S.L. Week 2238 (D.D.C. Nov. 22, 1955),
reversed 76 Sup. Ct. 880 (1956); contra Krueger v. Kinsella, 137 F. Supp. 806
(S.D.W.Va.), affirmed 76 Sup. Ct. 886 (1956) both decisions 5 to 4.
82 317 U.S. 1, 38 (1942); and see discussion of Quirin case supra page 59.
83 See Hurst supra note 10, at 422 n.135.
84 Case of Brig. Gen. Win. Hull, Printed Trial (1813).

Hull was found guilty of cowardice and sentenced to die. Because of his distinguished record as a soldier and because of his age, clemency was recommended
and President Madison remitted the sentence.
In United States v. Dickenson 5 the defendant was convicted of a violation
of Article 104. On appeal he urged that Article 104 was unconstitutional because
it subjected all persons to military jurisdiction for the crime of treason. The court
held that although it might not constitutionally be applied to civilians, the
defendant was in no position to attack it on that ground, since he did
not attack the military jurisdiction over him, and even if he did it was
clear that Article 104 applied to him. The court recognized that Article 104
and treason might define the same crime but did not see any significance in this
similarity unless the party charged was a civilian. It is submitted that both the
court and counsel failed to recognize the problem. It is not whether the military
had jurisdiction over the person, but whether the treason clause precludes the
military from exercising jurisdiction over the subject matter-treason.
Commentators"6 say, or assume, that treason, as such, is cognizable only in
the civil courts,37 but would allow prosecutions by the military to be determined,
not by the conduct that is charged, but by the name given to such conduct. Such
a position would render any benefits of the treason clause purely illusory.
In the Alley case3" the Government argued that since the fifth amendment
expressly excludes indictment in cases arising in the land or naval forces, it
would be impossible to bring this case in a civil court, since the case could only
be initiated there by indictment. It is true that criminal cases do not start in
the civil courts except by indictment; but there is nothing in the Constitution
to prevent an indictment of a person in the military when he commits a crime
that is cognizable by the civil courts." The fallacy in the Government's argument
is that the case does not arise when the facts upon which the charge is based
40
occur. The case arises when the charge is brought.
U.S.C.M.A. 438 (1955).
"Treason as such is not an offense properly cognizable by a court-martial." WINTHROP
629. See also McKinney supra note 27.
37 Cf. Matter of Stacy, 10 John. 328, 333 (N.Y. 1813). A civilian was being held by
the military for treason. In regard to this, Chancellor Kent said: "The pretended charge
of treason, without being founded upon oath, and without any specification of the matters
of which it might consist, and without any color of authority in any military tribunal to
try a citizen for that crime, is only aggravation of the oppression of the confinement."
(emphasis added.)
38 Supra note 8.
39 See Respublica v. McCarty, 2 Dall. 86 (1781).
40 United States ex tel. Toth v. Quarles, 76 Sup. Ct. 1 (1955).
See also Reed,
J., dissenting in the Toth case citing Re Bogart, 3 Fed. Cas. No. 1,596, pp. 796, 799
(C.C. Cal. 1873): "Among the ordinary and most common definitions of the word 'arise,'
are 'to proceed, to issue, to spring,' and a case arising in the land or naval forces upon a
fair and reasonable construction of the whole article, appears to us to be a case proceeding,
issuing or springing from acts in violation of the naval laws and regulations committed
while in the naval forces or service."
This construction exempts treason from military jurisdiction since the case would
arise under 18 U.S.C. § 2381 (1952), rather than Article 104. See also Note, 67 Harv. L.
Rev. 479, 488-92 (1954).
356
30

The location of the treason clause in Article III indicates that treason is
triable only in the civil courts. Hurst, in discussing the restrictive nature of the
treason clause, has stated:
There would seem significance in the fact that the Committee on Style
shifted the treason clause out of Article I into Article III in the final shaping
of the document; the matter of the scope of the offense had been so clearly
taken from Congress that it was logical to place the remaining admonition
of policy in that part of the
41 document dealing with the courts, which must
still administer the clause.

To allow other than Article III courts to have jurisdiction over treason might
allow the other tribunal to avoid the restrictions deemed necessary in a treason trial.
Even if it should be ruled that military men can be tried for treason in a
military court there seems to be no valid reason why the two-witness rule should
not apply. The two-witness requirement of Article III, Section 3, has been
recognized as one of the procedural guaranties of the Constitution, like that of
trial by jury.42 Many of the constitutional guaranties have been ruled inapplicable
to military trials, although the Uniform Code of Military Justice makes a salutary
change in some respects. The difficulties in requiring military courts to give
the accused the safeguards that are applicable in a civil court do not inhere in
the two-witness rule.4" Since the two-witness rule is evidentiary in nature, albeit
an important one, there would be no administrative problem in making it applicable to the military trial.
Generally, the rules of evidence in the military courts are the same as those
in the civil courts." Article 36 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice provides
that the President shall prescribe procedural rules and modes of proof for military
courts, basing such rules on those of the United States district courts.
In 1902 Congress recognized the problem in regards to the Philippine Islands
and passed a statute requiring the two-witness rule to be applied in treason trials,
both in the military and civil courts there. 45 Congress, assuming that all treason
41Hurst supra note 10, at 410-11. See also WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 489 n.2, and FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION (rev.
ed. 1937).
42 Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 237 (1940).
43 For'example the military courts apply the common law rule of evidence in perjury
trials (two witnesses or one corroborated witness). See MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL

ff2104 4 (1951).

See MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL Ch. XXVII (1951); Article 36, U.C.M.J.
1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 4 (d) 2 (3d ed. Supp. 1955): "It might have been supposed
that the military courts of the United States would have been most emphatically the
ones in which the common-law jury-trial rules of Evidence would find least recognition.
But the exact contrary is the case."
"Courts-martial, which are bound in general to observe the fundamental rules of
law and principles of justice observed and expounded by the civil judicature, are also in
general to be governed, upon trial, by the rules of evidence of the common law as
recognized and followed by the criminal courts of the country." WINTHROP 313.
4s "That no person in the Philippine Islands shall, under the authority of the United
States, be convicted of treason by any tribunal, civil or military, unless on the testimony
of two witnesses to the same overt act, or on confession in open court."
32 STAT.
55 (1902); repealed Oct. 31, 1951, c. 655, § 56(d), 65 STAT. 729 (1951); see Legislative History, U.S.C. Cong. & Ad. N. 2596 (1951): "Subsection (d) repeals as obsolete" sections relating "to the Philippine Islands and were omitted from such code some
time ago in view of the independence of the Philippine Islands." See also 7 WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE §§ 2036-39, 2039(d) n.2 (3d ed. Supp. 1955).

trials in the United States were protected by the Constitutional guaranties, intended that the treason trials in the Philippine Islands should have the same
protection."
Conclusion
The majority of subversive activities have been removed from the substantive
scope of the treason clause; the courts have psittacisticly followed the dictum of
Marshall in Ex parte Bollman.4 7 Ex parte Quirin48 has further limited the sub-

stantive scope of treason by allowing prosecution under some other heading despite
the presence of the elements of treason. The prosecution is merely required to
allege some other element not peculiar to treason. One convicted of the same
crime with a different label could still be given the same punishment as a
4
traitor; and the stigma attaching to him would not be lessened. 1
On the other hand, the procedural guaranties of the treason clause have
always been held applicable when treason itself is charged. Thus, whether the
accused is afforded the constitutional protections may depend, not on the conduct
which is the basis of the charge, but upon the charge as made by his accusers. The
primary purpose of the treason clause was to protect from prosecution for nonviolent political activity;" ° but it is also intended to afford certain safeguards to
those who actually commit overt acts of treason. 51
4635 Cong. Rec. 1734 (1902)
(notice of amendment); 35 Cong. Rec. 1965-66
(1902) (debate). Mr. Patterson, Senator from Colorado, felt that the prohibitions on Congress contained in the bill of rights were as applicable to the territories as to the states,
citing Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901). The amendment, which dealt with the
two-witness trule in treason trials, passed and became the law quoted supra in note 45
Surely if Congress felt this should apply to citizens of territories of the United States it
should certainly apply equally as well to citizens of the United States who are in the
armed forces. See also Sen. Doc. 173, 57th Cong., 1st Sess. (1902).
474 Cranch 75, 127 (U.S. 1807). "Crimes so atrocious as those which have for
their object the subversion by violence of those laws and those institutions which have
been ordained in order to secure the peace and happiness of society, are not to escape
punishment because they have not ripened into treason. The wisdom of the legislature
is competent to provide for the case; and the framers of our constitution, who not only
defined and limited the crime, but with jealous circumspection attempted to protect their
limitation by providing that no person should be convicted of it, unless on the testimony
of two witnesses to the same overt act, or on confession in open court, must have conceived it more safe that punishment in such cases should be ordained by general laws,
formed upon deliberation, under the influence of no resentments, and without knowing on
whom they were to operate, than that it should be inflicted under the influence of those
passions which the occasion seldom fails to excite, and which a flexible definition of the
crime, or a construction which would render it flexible, might bring into operation. It is,
therefore, more safe as well as more consonant to the principles of our constitution, that the
crime of treason should not be extended by construction to doubtful cases; and that crimes not
clearly within the constitutional definition, should receive such punishment as the legislature
in its wisdom may provide."
See note 11 supra for cases excluding subversive activities from the scope of the
treason clause.
48317 U.S. 1 (1942).
49 The stigma attached to a charge of "treason" may be a good reason for prosecution
under a different heading. See Hurst supra note 10, at 395, 424. But "collaboration"
imparts the same meaning. For example, the POW REPORT refers to the conduct of collaborators as "treasonous."
0 The framers of the Constitution accomplished this by the overt act requirement.
6 This was accomplished by requiring two witnesses to the overt act.

The treason clause has not served as the principle legal weapon in combatting
disloyalty. But the validity of the legal weapons which have been used has never
been adequately examined in light of its restrictive nature and policy. The treason
clause is passing from the obsolescent to the obsolete.
ALBERT S. JOHNSTON, III
GEORGE

J.

NOUMAIR

CIVILIANS BEFORE COURTS MARTIAL

On or about September 27, 1952 a Korean named Bang Swoon Kill was
apprehended by certain military authorities near a United States Air Base in Korea.
Later under order of a security officer, he was marched forward and shot by two
airmen. The officer and one airman were subsequently tried and convicted for
this crime.' But to the dismay of the Air Force, it was discovered that the third
perpetrator, Toth, had been discharged on December 8, 1952. On April 8, 1953
he was formally charged with conspiracy to murder 2 and murder.' Under authority
of Article 7 (b) of the Uniform Code Of Military Justice,4 he was apprehended
at his place of employment in Pittsburgh, Pa. After certain preliminaries, he was
flown to Korea to be tried by a court martial, jurisdiction being predicated upon
Article 3 (a) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.5
Thereafter Toth's sister applied for a writ of habeas corpus in the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia. Toth was returned from Korea;
the District Court granted the writ and ordered his release.' It reasoned that since
the Uniform Code of Military Justice was silent as to the procedure to be followed
in arresting and apprehending a civilian, Congress intended that the procedure
should be identical to that exercised by any civilian arresting officer. Thus, before
being removed to a distant point to stand trial, Toth should have been arraigned
before a United States Commissioner or any nearby officer empowered to commit
persons charged with offenses against the laws of the United States.!
26, col. 5.
50 U.S.C.A. § 675, Art. 81, U.C.M.J.
250 U.S.C.A. § 712, Art. 118, U.C.M.J.
4 50 U.S.C.A. § 561(b).
5 U.S.C.A. § 553 (a). Subject to the provisions of section 618 of this title, (statute of
limitations) any person charged with having committed while in a status in which
he was subject to this chapter, an offense against this chapter, punishable by confinement
of five years or more and for which the person cannot be tried in the courts of the
United States or any State or Territory thereof or of the District of Columbia, shall not
be relieved from amenability to trial by courts martial by reason of the termination of
such status.
6Toth v. Talbott, 113 F. Supp. 330 (D.C. 1953). As to the appropriate place
of hearing, see 67 Harv. L. Rev. 479 (1954).
7114 F. Supp. 468 (D.C. 1953).
1 N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1955, p.
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